a reinterpretation of IHL that drifts far from its history. In its origins, IHL was not designed to protect human dignity, but to reduce human suffering. The ICTY Trial Chamber instead viewed IHL through a human rights lens that assimilates the two motivations, as does Beitz and the authors he quotes. This is not a criticism of the Furundzija dictum. Law changes. In every field of law, latter-day authorities -paradigmatically, but not solely, courts and tribunalsretroactively reinterpret the law. Their reinterpretation takes on a self-fulfilling, performative role: the court's saying it is so helps make it so. This is the path of the law; it is one way law evolves. Perhaps the nature of IHL has evolved over time in the direction of human rights thinking, and should evolve that way.
That, in fact, is the view I will defend -with some qualifications -in the final sections of this essay. First, though, I want to explore the very different genealogies of IHL and human rights law, and explain how human rights thinking migrated into IHL.
(To briefly foreshadow my argument, I attribute the migration to international criminal law, military occupations, and the U.S. war on terrorism.) In the final sections, I explore two ways human rights thinking can be pursued in wars. One of them, I will argue, overplays and overestimates what human rights thinking can accomplish. It does so by, in effect, willing away fundamental differences between war and peace. The other is an approach that I have defended for more than three decades. It consists, at bottom, of taking a civilian's-eye view of the disasters of war and reading the law accordinglyrecognizing, one might say, that Mother Courage and her children matter just as much to the law of war as Henry V and his band of brothers.
Human rights thinking and human dignity
latter is a commitment to treat human rights as rights. It is hard to see how someone who rejects the commitment to valuing humans as individuals could believe in human dignity under any conceivable definition. Nor could someone who rejects the commitment to viewing concern for the individual as an entitlement rather than a gratuity believe that human rights are, in fact, rights. Someone who shares these individual-value and entitlement commitments will engage in what I call human rights thinking, and will incline to bring it into the interpretation of law, including humanitarian law. Notice also that these commitments imply the kind of universalism characteristic of international human rights: everyone has human dignity and human rights, regardless of nationality.
Let me reiterate that human rights thinking is not the same thing as human rights theory or human rights law. The individual-value and entitlement commitments are pretheoretical and pre-legal. As bare normative attitudes, they are too general and too thin to generate a theory of human dignity or human rights on their own. A full-fledged theory will need additional premises to get off the ground.
To illustrate: some religious people will ground human dignity in the divine creation of an immortal human soul, or in humanity's divinely-ordained superiority to the rest of nature. Secularists might ground human dignity in rationality, or in autonomy, or in agency -or, as I think, in the reciprocal recognition of the dignity of others: the relation between the dignifier and the dignified. 4 Provided the believer and the secularist share a commitment to honoring individual human worth as an entitlement, both engage in human rights thinking, and both may wind up approaching concrete practical issues of implementation the same way even though their theories of human dignity are radically inconsistent.
If Feinberg is right (as I think he is), the entitlement commitment seamlessly meshes with the commitment to viewing others as, in his words, dignified objects of respect. But that commitment could come from many possible religious or secular doctrines -or, for that matter, from no doctrine at all.
Human rights thinking and humanitarianism: no necessary connection
The next question is whether everyone who participates in the project of furthering humanitarian law shares the twin commitments of human rights thinking. The answer is no; they may, but they don't have to. An anti-individualist who believes that individuals take on value only within and through collectivities, or even a cynic who doesn't think individuals matter much in the great scheme of things, can still favor regulating war to minimize suffering and destruction; and a commitment to eliminate unnecessary suffering and destruction does not imply that humane treatment is a right.
I don't mean this purely as a theoretician's point. Everyone working in this area has met tough-minded humanitarians with years of field experience who are allergic to human rights pieties and skeptical that their job has to do with enhancing human dignity rather than stanching the flow of blood in catastrophes. Some of these workers nonetheless put their lives on the line repeatedly in the world's most dangerous conflict 5 Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy 58-59 (1973).
zones, perhaps feeling more affinity with the combat soldiers than with the human rights NGOs. For that matter, operational military lawyers and advisors may be whole-heartedly committed to humanitarian law, but view it as a matter of military honor rather than human rights. Of course, other humanitarian workers and lawyers do share the individualvalue and entitlement commitments, and believe that their humanitarian efforts are part of a larger human rights project. As a factual matter, then, human rights thinking is optional, not mandatory, for humanitarians. There is no intrinsic connection between the humanitarian project and the human rights project.
As the papers in this volume illustrate, it is a difficult and contested legal question whether international human rights law (hereafter "IHRL") takes priority over IHL, or the other way around, or neither, in armed conflicts. This can be treated as a lawyer's technical question. As such, it quickly leads down the rabbit hole into a Wonderland of dueling dicta, fragmented legal authorities, conflicting proportionality tests, and numbing intricacy. The International Court of Justice and the UN Human Rights Committee tell us that human rights law applies at all times, but they add that in wartime it must be interpreted through the lex specialis of IHL. Such a view, which Witt finds in the outlook of Dunant's contemporary Francis Lieber, --the drafter of the first modern code of IHL -of course has a hard time making sense of the suffering of innocent civilians. Indeed, Lieber's thinking is quite antithetical to negative benthamism, and thus to the tradition of IHL I am describing. Famously, Lieber was among those who believed that ferocious wars that inflict a great deal of suffering will be shorter, and therefore save more lives in the long run. As Witt shows in his magnificent historical study Lincoln's Code: The Laws of War in American History (2012), U.S. delegates to the Hague conferences trotted out Lieber's "short, sharp wars" thesis to ward off humanitarian rules they disliked. Id. at . Thus, the tradition of IHL I am describing is not at all Lieber's view; however, it does represent the international view embodied in the St. Petersburg Declaration and the Hague Conventions.
Of course, what is remarkable about Lieber's "short, sharp wars" thesis is its total lack of any empirical basis. Obviously, there is no way to know whether more or fewer lives would have been lost if a war had been fought differently under different rules. There is nothing "realist" about an argument couched in the idiom of alternate-reality fiction.
worth. For it does this only by in effect treating individual persons as of no worth; since not persons … but the experiences of pleasure or satisfaction or happiness which persons have are the sole items of worth or elements of value.
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Each counts for one because none counts for anything. In the familiar language of Rawls, Nozick, and Hart, utilitarianism disregards the separateness of persons.
Within humanitarian law, there is no clearer example than the doctrine of in bello proportionality, which forbids attacks in which "incidental" civilian damage is anticipated to exceed concrete and direct military advantage. The "incidental" civilian damage is aggregate damage from the attack. It follows that individual civilians can lose protection from attack merely because they have the bad luck to be near an important target and surrounded by too few other civilians. Their human rights play no role in the proportionality assessment, which aggregates damage to civilian persons, and indeed aggregates damage to persons with damage to inanimate objects. Perhaps the decision to label unintended civilian damage "incidental" is already a tip-off that human dignity does not play a starring role in the proportionality rule.
One might object that the proportionality rule is simply one feature of the broader principle of distinction, and that principle should be understood as a recognition of the human dignity of non-combatants. That is possible, and understanding it this way represents human rights thinking in IHL. But the principle of distinction can just as readily be interpreted along benthamite lines as an effort to minimize unnecessary suffering in war, given the axiom that targeting civilians is militarily unnecessary. That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men….
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The first clause sets out a benthamite rationale for IHL (alleviating the calamities of war), while the third asserts the (debatable but henceforth axiomatic) military proposition that disabling combatants is by itself sufficient to win wars. Although the operative portions of the St. Petersburg Declaration do not include the principle of distinction, the principle follows naturally from the reasoning in this preamble. If disabling combatants suffices to win wars, targeting civilians is unnecessary, so it is not (in the words of the second clause) a "legitimate object" for states. The reasoning, grounding IHL in the benthamite concern to alleviate the calamities of war rather than respect for human dignity, seems the more plausible origin of the principle of distinction. This is not to deny that there were human dignity concepts in the historical law of war. Quite the contrary: from the time of The Iliad to the chivalric period to modern times, the laws of war placed heavy emphasis on the dignity of the warriors. When two Homeric princes set about the grim business of trying to slaughter each other, recognizing the enemy as a doughty warrior like oneself is the form respecting human dignity takes.
In the Mahabharata, the dharmayudda ("righteous war") emphasizes chivalry and symmetrical response: chariots must fight other chariots, and it would be dishonorable, contrary to the dharma, for a charioteer to fight a mere foot-soldier. 14 
Humanitarianism and disaster relief
Sometimes newcomers find the label "humanitarian law" applied to the law of armed conflict startling -almost a joke, and not an especially funny one. War is the least humanitarian of activities. The incongruity dissolves, of course, once we understand that the label doesn't refer to war-fighting, but to the effort to mitigate the suffering it inflicts.
In this respect, humanitarianism in the face of war is like humanitarianism in the face of earthquakes, floods, plagues, or famines: it aims at disaster relief. When the disasters are natural, we do not think of the victims' sufferings as human rights violations.
Mother Nature has not violated the victims' human rights by causing an earthquake.
18
From the point of view of common people through most of history, wars were like natural disasters. The Second Horseman of the Apocalypse, "given power to take peace from the earth and to make men slay each other" (Revelations 6:3-4), rides side by side with Famine, Pestilence, and Death, representing natural disasters. 19 Wars were launched by distant princes for inscrutable reasons; warriors descended on the countryside like a force of nature; common people suffered and died, as in a plague. Those were the facts of life. The humanitarian mission, when it existed, was to ease the pain -not because the rights of the suffering had been violated, but because human compassion and simple decency demanded it.
Of course, we don't have to see things this way: we can recognize that warfighters are not impersonal violent forces; they have agency and responsibility.
International criminal law insists that we view them that way -and, I will suggest below, international criminal law was one of the forces that brought human rights thinking into humanitarian law. My point here is that in its original motivation, humanitarian law is more like disaster relief than the vindication of rights.
Disaster relief seldom if ever makes the victims of a large-scale disaster whole;
that is nearly impossible. This is another signal that humanitarianism has little to do with the rights of the victims. There is an illuminating parallel in the law of torts. When an individual suffers a tort, she has a right to compensation, typically if fancifully described as "making her whole." In mass torts with thousands of victims, make-whole compensation seldom happens; it would cost too much, and the threat of defendant bankruptcy that would further deplete the settlement fund keeps awards relatively small.
The settlement fund pays victims a few cents on the dollar; it offers help but not full compensation. As thoughtful commentators have noticed, that makes the settlements in mass tort more like disaster relief than make-whole compensation -and to just that extent, they have faint connection to the victims' rights, only to their needs, and even there only up to a point. 20 And, of course, "disaster relief" as I have described it is another name for negative benthamism in the face of catastrophes.
A Genealogy of International Human Rights Law
The creation story of the UDHR is also well known. It has been elegantly told in the books by Mary Ann Glendon and Johannes Morsink. Only slightly less well-known is the diplomacy that went into the U.N. Charter's embrace of human rights (although on the latter issue there is historical controversy over whether the prime movers were diplomats or NGOs). 21 Notable in the UDHR story are:
(i) the focus on individual rights -in which the individualist emphasis, championed by the Lebanese diplomat-philosopher Charles Malik, ultimately prevailed over Soviet objections;
22
(ii) the decision to ground individual rights in "human dignity" (a phrase originally inserted in the drafts by René Cassin, to echo the UN Charter's invocation of "the dignity and worth of the human person"); and (iii) the inclusion in the Preamble of the important claim that human beings "are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood." As Glendon tells the story, the latter idea was a true East-West product.
When he submitted his draft of the UDHR, Cassin explained that "the concept of solidarity and fraternity among men" was one of its two leading ideas (the other was "that every human being has a right to be treated like every other human being"). 23 Cassin's idea was endorsed by the influential Chinese delegate P. C. Chang, who emphasized a Confucian concept similar to Cassin's "solidarity and fraternity": "two-man mindedness"
(ren, 仁, typically translated as "sympathy" or "benevolence"). 24 Eventually, the drafters chose to call this capacity "conscience" -perhaps not the best word, but etymologically suggestive ('con-science', 'knowing-with', suggests two-man mindedness).
The idea was clear even if the word-choice is not: reason alone, unaccompanied by conscience, fraternity, sympathy, ren (call it what you will ) cannot motivate us to care
22 Glendon, at 39-42. 23 Glendon, at 67. 24 Id. The Analects of Confucius offers two characterizations of ren: "Now the ren man, wishing himself to be established, sees that others are established, and, wishing himself to be successful, sees that others are successful." Analects 6:30. "When you are out in the world, act as if meeting an important guest. … What you don't want done to yourself, don't do to others" (the so-called negative Golden Rule), Analects 12:2.
about the rights of distant strangers in distant lands. 25 The important point for present purposes is that benevolence and sympathy are emphatically not the moral sentiments at work in armed conflict. On the battlefield, the prevailing moral sentiments are hate, rage, fear, and one-sided loyalty, occasionally tempered with compassion. There can hardly be a clearer indication that the drafters of the UDHR were not thinking about standards of conduct in war.
Indeed, the opening paragraphs of the UDHR's preamble focus entirely on peace,
arguing that human rights are the precondition of peace; and of course the UN Charter's preamble begins with the determination "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind." The contrast drawn in both documents is between a world of human rights and peace, and a world bereft of human rights, and as a consequence doomed to the untold sorrow of war. The idea of human rights as standards of conduct in war was simply not in the same conceptual universe as the Charter and the UDHR -not because of substantive disagreement, but because the Charter and the UDHR projects are to offer a roadmap out of war, not a roadmap for how war must be waged.
For the framers of human rights law, the main point was to get states to honor the human rights of their own people. Eventually, the project expanded to include the notion that the international community should provide backup for the human rights of people in other states whose own governments would not or could not honor them. , 1984) . Eide explicitly credits Shue with this conception of human rights (id.); Eide's duty to "respect" rights corresponds with Shue's duty "to avoid depriving" people of the rights, while his duty to "fulfill" the rights corresponds with Shue's "duty to aid" (dropping, however, Shue's argument that the duty to aid is grounded in reparation for earlier deprivation). "respect, protect, fulfill" indeed represents the structure of human rights in the best thinking of the human rights community, it becomes clear that human rights is a peacetime project. A state at war can hardly be expected to provide social guarantees to fulfill a panoply of human rights for the population of its adversary. I note that Shue himself is skeptical that IHL has much to do with human rights. "kinship usually has a rather weak force among those who live in natural liberty with each other," 36 it suffices to make "common sociality" possible.
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Such debates are irresolvable, and it is not my purpose to delve into them any further. The important point is that those who see peace as the normal condition of human life will regard respect for peacetime human rights as a baseline, and the normative requirements in war as an aberration. And, of course, vice-versa: those who regard war as regrettable but not aberrational will grant equal normative rank to the laws of war, and won't be inclined to interpret them through human rights thinking. Precisely because the arguments about the natural baseline of human existence are impossible to resolve, this clash of normative commitments will be as well.
The Great Transformation
It is an interesting historical question when human rights thinking first began to enter IHL. Gabriella Blum has noted that international criminal law individualizes agency in war crimes, because it charges individual defendants, rather than holding the entire collectivity responsible for intercommunal violence -even though the latter might be a more truthful way to look at matters. 41 I agree with Blum, but my present point is that ICL also individualizes victims. The indictment will charge that perpetrator P killed victims A, B, and C, and raped victims D, E, and F, and that these were grave breaches and crimes against humanity. The fatal encounter involves a rights-violator with a name and the named victim whose rights are violated. Under the retributive and expressive rationales for criminal punishment (although not the deterrence or incapacitation rationales), the justice meted out by the tribunals aims to vindicate the dignity of individualized victims. This is human rights thinking, even if ICL is by no means identical with human rights law. The vindication of human dignity, not (or not only) the reduction of aggregate suffering, lies at the core of international criminal law.
Occupation. As we saw above, the only hint of protection of the rights of civilians in the Hague Conventions was in military occupations. That makes sense. When an army occupies foreign territory, IHL requires that it take over governance responsibilities in that territory. The occupier is the surrogate of the occupied state, and it assumes its obligations, except to the extent that the fighting is still going on and security requires martial measures. In a world that takes IHRL seriously, governance implies that occupation law must be constrained by human rights standards. They blend together. In occupations, human rights thinking in IHL seems natural and inevitable.
In recent decades, the two most important armed conflicts for the development of The occupation applies only to the territory where such authority is established, and can Gross proposes a functional approach, in which we unbundle the various responsibilities of an occupier to examine which of them is actually within the power of the occupier to address.
This approach is a form of human rights thinking, because Gross believes as an ethical matter that "the responsibility of an occupier is as great as its power." 47 If the "occupier" can effectively exercise governance functions, and no conflicting sovereign can do so, it must -and governance functions fall within the province of human rights.
The same idea appears in Judge Giovanni Bonello's eloquent concurring opinion to the European Court's Al-Skeini decision. The war on terrorism. The U.S. war on terrorism, in which any geographical locale harboring al Qaeda and its (unnamed) associated forces is a potential battle space, regardless of whether the state regards itself as at peace or at war with the United States, lends special urgency to human rights thinking. As I argued soon after 9/11, an unending 53 Id. at 792-93. 54 Furthermore, Parks misreads the Israeli opinion. The portion he quotes says that "a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities cannot be attacked at such time as he is doing so, if a less harmful means can be employed. In our domestic law, that rule is called for by the principle of proportionality." PCATI v. Israel, ¶40, Parks's emphasis added. He reads the quoted language to say that only Israeli domestic law calls for the use of less harmful means. In fact, Justice Barak's opinion does not say that the requirement can be derived only from the domestic law principle and exists only within Israeli domestic law. Read in context, he first sets out an interpretation of international law and then, because that interpretation "has not yet crystalized" in "the 'gray' cases" of customary international law, he finds a domestic law source as well. 55 PCATI v. Israel, ¶ ¶2, 40, 41, 60, which emphasize capture is especially feasible in border areas proximate to Israel, or within Israeli territory, or under the conditions of belligerent occupation. 56 The ICRC study does acknowledge that capturing rather than killing most likely to be feasible in military occupations and police actions, not "classic large-scale confrontations between well-equipped and organized armed forces." But it doesn't rule out the capture-don't-kill requirement even in the latter. Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities (ICRC 2009), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf, at 80-81. armed conflict of indeterminate and potentially unlimited geographical scope threatens to depress peacetime human rights to the more limited rights protected by IHL.
57
Why "more limited"? Consider that under IHL, enemy combatants can be targeted based on status alone, regardless of their level of personal involvement or actual behavior; standards of evidence and due process for killing or detaining suspected enemies are relaxed far below those of peacetime civilian life; civilians and their property can lawfully be exposed to higher risk of collateral damage than peacetime life would ever tolerate. 58 Faced with the prospect of long-term displacement of human rights to the lower level of wartime protections, it seems quite proper to push back by trying to inject human rights thinking into the laws of war. Otherwise, the entire project of international human rights is as good as gone -placed in perpetual derogation by an endless war on terrorism. Once the U.S. government declares that in principle all the world could be a battlefield, then the demand for human rights even on the battlefield becomes entirely justifiable.
Overextending human rights thinking
It is entirely possible for human rights advocates to push back too hard and too far -to deny that armed conflict is different, in fact decisively different, from peacetime. The most common form of this denial is insisting that contemporary state conflicts with terrorist groups are always law enforcement matters governed by human rights standards of due process in targeting, arresting, detaining, and trying terrorism suspects. I agree that But in other cases, denying the existence of an armed conflict and insisting on peacetime due process standards flies in the face of reality. Human rights groups have reflexively described drone strikes as extrajudicial assassinations without due process of law. 62 They can be under some circumstances. But they needn't be. A drone is nothing more than a platform for long-distance weapons delivery, no different in principle from a bomber or for that matter a cannon. It is clearly permissible to use long-distance weapons in an armed conflict. Indeed, in an armed conflict a targeted killing is not only different from an illegal assassination, it is the only legally permitted form of killing: the opposite of a targeted attack is an untargeted and therefore indiscriminate attack. The argument that low-level conflicts with terrorist groups can never, as a matter of human rights principle, count as armed conflicts, only as law enforcement problems, seems dogmatic and wrong in a world where law enforcement against terrorists is spotty and often nonexistent or even impossible. 63 The argument overextends the proper reach of human rights thinking, declaring that the rule of law prevails everywhere -presumably, in the hope that declaring it so will make it so.
Another overextension of human rights thinking arises in some of the revisionist just war theory that occupies a prominent place in contemporary philosophical discussions of war. Some revisionists operate from within a framework set by three constrained because in domestic society the need for self-help is an exception. Leviathan is a few blocks away in a police cruiser, and even on mean streets, most of the time you can flee or dial 911, rather than pulling out a gun and blazing away. In peacetime society, trigger-happy defenders can be more dangerous than murderers; hence the narrow conditions of personal self-defense in domestic law. That's a poor model of self-defense in wartime.
As for the wartime use of lethal violence, it cannot always be narrowly focused on all and only those individuals who actually pose a threat, because in the fog of war we seldom know which is which. Individual liability is far too granular a criterion for violence in armed conflict, where action is at a distance and armed enemies operate in groups. The domestic analogy of war to peacetime conflict risks losing sight of the terrifying disanalogies, and I think revisionists would do well to abandon their domestic hypotheticals and show a bit more skepticism about moral intuitions honed in peacetime society.
Human rights thinking and the civilian point of view
What, then, is the proper place for human rights thinking in armed conflict? We have seen it several times in the course of this argument: it consists in a heightened solicitude toward the civilians caught in a battle space whose basic rights are affected by the war.
This heightened solicitude can manifest itself in many specific ways. As someone who has written about various aspects of just war from the standpoint of human rights thinking, I will risk self-indulgence and draw from my own work to illustrate. I don't mean to suggest that the positions on the issues that follow are the only ones that human rights thinking permits, or even that they harmonize perfectly with human rights thinking.
They don't. They merely represent one line of thought that brings human rights thinking to bear on the theory of just war and IHL. 67 The term "basic rights" can be understood intuitively as the most fundamental human rights; but I prefer Shue's definition of basic rights as those human rights (like the right to physical security against violence and to minimum subsistence) the fulfillment of which is necessary to enjoying any other human rights.
(1) A just war is a war in defense of basic human rights, or (alternatively) a war of self-defense against an unjust war.
(2) An unjust war, on the other hand, is a war subversive of human rights that is not a war in defense of basic human rights. and it is an aspect of the defense of basic rights.
One might object that by weighing the magnitude of a nascent attack on basic rights against the magnitude of an armed preventive response, the preventive war argument departs from human rights thinking by aggregating rather than individuating rights infringements. According to this objection, genuinely human rights-based thinking would focus instead on the fact that a preventive war will inevitably damage innocent civilians in violation of their own basic rights. Because the war is preventive, neither they nor their state has actually done anything yet that would justify an attack on their rights.
72 71 The circumstances, I have argued, are tailored narrowly to an adversary whose ideology and past history of violence, combined with current hostile intentions and weapons programs, make it likely that it plans to launch an attack when it acquires the capacity. Furthermore, it has to be an attack with a weapon one use of which is likely to cause mass casualties. belligerent intentions, demonstrated through ongoing action, past track record, and ideology. Not just any remote threat to basic rights is a just cause for preventive war, only one that crosses a high risk threshold because the adversary is deliberately pushing toward the brink. My claim here is that warding off high-likelihood massive threats to rights, even though they are not certain, is required by the "protect" obligation in the "respect, protect, fulfill" trio.
Jus ex bello. Parallel reasoning about risk to basic human rights can be used to address the question of jus ex bello, the morality of when one must terminate a just war.
Can states keep fighting a just war until they have so decisively beaten their adversary that the risk the adversary poses to basic rights is effectively reduced to zero? To say yes means that the state can keep pounding away until the adversary's military capability is not merely defeated but completely pulverized. Cast in the language of risk, that means the state could continue to transfer risks from its own population to the population of the enemy even when its marginal gains in safety are slight and the marginal damage to the enemy's population are large. This, under human rights thinking, is immoral. The world is an intrinsically risky place, with an irreducible "cosmic background radiation" of risks to basic rights posed by enemies. States are never justified in continuing a war that shifts risks onto others once they have reduced their own to the background level. 82 Therefore soldiers must take on the same minimum levels of risk to spare "enemy" civilians as they would to spare their own civilians. (Of course, they can choose take additional heroic risks, and it would not be wrong to do so selectively on behalf of their own civilians.) Does this argument also mean that soldiers can transfer risks to civilians at a oneto-one exchange rate? If all else were equal, human rights thinking answers yes: the individual-worth commitment is egalitarian. The complication is that all else is not equal, because in many cases the soldiers are the ones creating the risk to civilians, and common sense morality suggests that the larger burden of risk falls on risk-causers than innocent bystanders. In the words of the old tort chestnut Rylands v. Fletcher, "When one person, in managing his own affairs, causes, however innocently, damage to another, it is obviously only just that he should be the party to suffer." 83 Here, as in other instances of human rights thinking, examining the problem from the standpoint of the innocent civilian helps us disentangle a knotty problem. Although the morality of war cannot ask soldiers to take suicidal risks to save civilians, their vocation requires them to take on some additional risk to spare the basic rights of civilians, because the soldiers are the ones whose attacks create the risk to civilians. However, the Hostages formula remains distinctly forgiving to militaries under the guise of necessity:
Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any amount and kind of force to compel the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money. The important difference between this marginal conception of necessity and the Hostages formula is that the latter simply ignores the rights of civilians, where the marginal conception demands that necessity assessments take full account of them.
No doubt objections could be raised against all the arguments and conclusions I have canvassed here. My aim here is not to defend them, but to propose them as examples of the kind of human rights thinking that rightfully belongs in IHL -human rights thinking that does not downplay the difference between war and peace, but that insists on the basic human rights of civilians as well as warriors as the moral heart of just war theory properly conceived -in the language of Furundzija with which I began this essay, "the essence of the whole corpus of international humanitarian law as well as human rights law."
